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LESSONS FOR THE SADC FROM THE INDIAN CASE OF NOVARTIS AG v 
UNION OF INDIA 
L Ndlovu 
1  Introduction 
The Southern African Development Community (SADC) continues to face health 
related challenges in the context of HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, heart disease, 
cancer, hepatitis and a host of other ailments. Although regional cooperation has seen 
the HIV/AIDS infection rate on the decline, the disease burden in other areas, 
especially in tuberculosis and life-style diseases such as heart disease, is not on the 
decline.1 
The SADC region depends largely on imported patented medicines to deal with the 
burgeoning disease burden, but the medicines are expensive. Although some SADC 
members such as South Africa, Zimbabwe and Mozambique have limited 
pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity, the volumes of locally produced drugs are 
inadequate to deal with the disease burden. As members of the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO), SADC members can take advantage of the flexibilities introduced 
by the Agreement on Trade Related aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 
and override patent rights in some specified instances in order to access affordable 
essential medicines. 
One of the TRIPS flexibilities is the leeway given to WTO members to decide within 
the confines of their national laws and contexts what amounts to patentable subject 
matter and to exclude certain inventions, such as diagnostics, methods of treating the 
human or animal body, and new uses of existing patents from registration as patents.2 
                                        
  Lonias Ndlovu. LLB, LLM (Fort Hare), LLD (Unisa). Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, School of 
Postgraduate Studies, North West University, Mafikeng Campus. Email: Lonias.Ndlovu@nwu.ac.za. 
This article is based on a doctoral thesis submitted by the author for the completion of the degree 
Doctor of Laws at the University of South Africa. 
1  Kredo et al 2012 Health Policy and Systems 2.  
2  For example, in terms of s 25(11) of the South African Patents Act 57 of 1978, methods for treating 
the animal or human body and diagnostics are not patentable since they are deemed to be 
incapable of application in trade, industry or agriculture. However, the same law provides for new 
use patents in s 25(9). 
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One of the major causes of high drug prices, which create affordability barriers, is the 
notorious practice by pharmaceutical companies of extending patent life spans beyond 
the mandatory 20 year period by filing for secondary patents.3 Secondary patents may 
be granted for minor additions or embellishments to drug formulae, thus extending 
the life span of the patent, preventing the entry of generic drugs onto the market, and 
thereby creating monopolistic prices. This notorious practice is called patent 
evergreening and is one of the reasons why drug prices remain high. Evergreening 
may be cured by introducing strict requirements for patentability so that only those 
inventions which are new, involve an inventive step, and are capable of industrial 
application may be patented.4 
This paper highlights how the legislative inclusion of TRIPS flexibilities around the 
requirements for patentability5 can be effectively used to curb incremental patenting.6 
The paper critically analyses the 2013 Supreme Court of India case of Novartis AG v 
Union of India. Firstly, the paper outlines, albeit briefly, the WTO TRIPS provisions 
regarding the patentability of new-use patents and contextualises the discussion to 
South Africa and the SADC region. Secondly, the paper narrates the facts of the 
relevant case before coming to an analysis that highlights useful lessons for the SADC 
region in its quest to reform intellectual property (IP) laws in order to curb 
evergreening. Finally, the paper concludes with a summary of the major highlights of 
the case and recommendations, urging SADC members to use the decision as a 
reflection of good law that should inform IP law reforms which might have the 
consequence of improving access to medicines. 
  
                                        
3  In terms of A 33 of the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (1994) 
(TRIPS), the term of protection for a patent shall be 20 years counting from the filing date. S 46 
of the South African Patents Act provides for the same period subject to the payment of renewal 
fees by the patentee. 
4  These desirable requirements are generally spelt out in A 27 of TRIPS. 
5  A 27(1) of TRIPS. 
6  According to Eisenberg 2005 Yale J Health Pol'y L & Ethics 717. Evergreening is a practice 
consisting in the extension of the commercial life of a patent through the filing of applications for 
the patenting of new uses of the same product or for marginally improved substances or 
derivatives. Evergreening is frowned upon because it has anti-competitive effects, delays the entry 
of generics on the market, and negatively impacts on drug prices.  
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2  The patentability of new uses of patents: a brief contextual overview 
The general rule on patentable subject matter under the TRIPS Agreement is that, 
subject to exceptions set out therein, patents shall be available for all inventions, 
whether products or processes, in all fields of technology, provided that they are new, 
involve an inventive step, and are capable of industrial application.7 
However, invention is not defined in the TRIPS Agreement and this leaves WTO 
members with the flexibility to define the scope of the concept of invention under their 
national laws.8 This flexibility may have both positive and negative implications for 
access to medicines. On the one hand, the absence of a definition may make it possible 
for WTO members to exclude new uses of drugs from patentability under their national 
laws.9 On the other hand, other WTO members may take advantage of the absence 
of a definition and use it to frustrate access to medicines by granting patents to new 
and sometimes minimally improved uses of drugs. Standards should, therefore, be set 
to avoid the granting of patents for "evergreen" or "me-too" drugs that extend patent 
duration without an improvement to the drugs' efficacy.10 These types of drugs can 
be broadly defined as "chemically related to the prototype, or other chemical 
compounds which have an identical mechanism of action".11 
The proponents of new use patents justify them on the basis that the discovery of a 
new use may require the same level of investment as that which obtained with the 
first patent.12 According to Musungu, Villanueva and Blasetti,13 the forms of innovation 
                                        
7  A 27(1) of the TRIPS.  
8  S 25 of the South African Patents Act 57 of 1978 specifies the requirements for patentability in 
terms similar to those of the TRIPS Agreement, but on the aspect of industrial application (utility), 
the law says the patent must be useful in trade, industry and agriculture (emphasis added). The 
South African Patents Act does not define an invention. 
9  Musungu, Villanueva and Blasetti Utilizing TRIPS Flexibilities 15. 
10  According to Vawda and Baker 2013 AHRLJ 72, drug companies extend patent monopolies by 
making minor variations to existing drugs, thus stifling competition through the development of 
"me-too drugs" for patentability in terms similar terms to those of the TRIPS Agreement; but on 
the aspect of industrial application (utility), the law says the patent must useful in trade, industry 
and agriculture (emphasis added). The South African Patents Act does not define an invention.  
10  Musungu, Villanueva and Blasetti Utilizing TRIPS Flexibilities 15. 
11  Gerattini 1997 Journal of Nephrology 283.  
12  However, according to Correa Guide to Pharmaceutical Patents 46, a majority of such patents 
might not have been granted if adequate standards of assessing patentability requirements had 
been applied. 
13  Musungu, Villanueva and Blasetti Utilizing TRIPS Flexibilities 15. 
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in the pharmaceutical industry for which patents may be claimed vary from 
breakthrough discoveries to minor modifications of existing medications.14 The authors 
cite examples from a study that was conducted by the National Institute of Healthcare 
Management Research and Educational Foundation which showed that in the 12 year 
period from 1989 to 2000 in the United States, the market with the largest number of 
pharmaceutical patents, of the 1035 new drugs approved by the Federal Regulatory 
Agency only 35 per cent contained a new active ingredient.15 According to the report 
cited, during the 12 year period only 15 per cent of the medicines were highly 
innovative drugs.16 The logical conclusion which may be drawn from the study, 
therefore, is that the bulk of new medicines are modified versions of older drugs, 
which ironically cost more than the original ones on which they are based. 
On a related note, India has raised the criteria for patentability so as to prevent 
evergreen patents from being registered.17 In the specific Indian context, applicants 
are made to establish to a high degree of certainty that the medication for which an 
application for a patent has been made is more effective than (emphasis added) those 
medications already used for the same condition.18 
In India the relevant law19 allows members of the public to bring to the attention of 
the patent controller evidence which may lead to patent rejection.20 The existence of 
this remedial measure made it possible for the Indian Network of People living with 
HIV/AIDS and the Manipur Network of Positive People to successfully oppose 
GlaxoSmithKline (GSK)'s patent application for the drugs zidovudine and lamivudine in 
2006 on the basis that the patent claim in the specific instance was not for a new 
invention.21 
                                        
14  Such claims were held to retard progress and innovation by the US Supreme Court in the case of 
KSR International v Teleflex Inc 550 US 398 15. 
15  Musungu, Villanueva and Blasetti Utilizing TRIPS Flexibilities 15, citing from NIHCM 2002 
http://www.nihcm.org/pdf/innovations.pdf 3. 
16  That is to say, drugs which contain new active ingredients and at the same time provide significant 
clinical improvement. 
17  See s 3(d) of the Indian Patent (Amendment) Act 2005. 
18  Angell Truth About Drug Companies 75. 
19  S 3(d) of the Indian Patent (Amendment) Act 2005. 
20  Adusei 2011 JWIP 12. 
21  Adusei 2011 JWIP 12. 
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It is submitted that the case discussed below demonstrates that at least in the Indian 
context, having higher patentability requirements in order to prevent weak or 
evergreen patents does have positive results for access to medicines. 
3  The case of Novartis AG v Union of India22 
3.1  Contextual background to the case  
On 1 April 2013 the Indian Supreme Court delivered what it described as a very 
important judgment in Novartis AG v Union of India (hereafter the Novartis case)23 in 
an appeal that had been brought to it by Novartis, a Swiss-based pharmaceutical 
company with a business presence in India, against rejection by the Indian Patent 
Office of a product patent application for a specific compound, the beta crystalline 
form of Imatinib Mesylate.24 Novartis lost the case because the Supreme Court ruled 
that the beta crystalline form of Imatinib Mesylate failed both the tests of invention 
and patentability.25 
The crux of the matter was whether or not the appellant was entitled to a patent for 
the beta crystalline form of the compound Imatinib Mesylate, which is a therapeutic 
drug for chronic myeloid leukaemia and certain kinds of tumours and is marketed 
under the name "Glivec" or "Gleevec".26 
3.2  The Pertinent Facts and other Background Information 
The drug Glivec, manufactured by Novartis Pharmaceuticals, was originally invented 
by Jurg Zimmerman, a medicinal chemist, who invented a number of derivatives of N-
phenyl-2-pyrimidineamine.27 The name Imatinib was given to one of the derivatives 
                                        
22  Novartis AG v India (Supreme Court of India) Civil Appeal No 2706-2716 of 1 April 2013 (Novartis 
case). 
23  The importance of this judgment and the case was highlighted by the Supreme Court's remark at 
para 22 that, "in the end all agreed that given the importance of the matter, this Court may itself 
decide the appeals instead of directing the appellant to move the High Court". 
24  Abbott 2013 Intellectual Property Watch 1. 
25  Novartis case para 195. The tests for invention and patentability are provided for in in s 2(1)(j)-
(ja) and s 3(d) of the Patents Act. 
26  Novartis case para 3. 
27  Novartis case para 5. 
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as a non-proprietary name by the World Health Organisation.28 The derivatives, 
including Imatinib, are capable of inhibiting certain protein enzymes and have valuable 
anti-cancer properties, which makes them suitable for the treatment of warm blooded 
animals.29 Imatinib and other derivatives were submitted to the United States (US) 
Patent Office for the registration of a patent therein on 28 April 1994 and the patent 
sought was granted in 1996.30 
After further research revealed that the beta crystalline form of Imatinib31 is more 
stable, Novartis sought to patent this in the US as well, and after initial opposition 
from the Patent Office, a patent was granted in the US.32 Novartis also applied for a 
patent in India for the same product in 1998,33 but the application was considered 
only in 2005, when India became truly compliant with the TRIPS Agreement.34 
The basis for Novartis' patent application for the beta crystalline form of Imatinib in 
India was an alleged inventive step that materialised when a two-stage invention 
process involving the introduction of a specified amount of beta crystals into the base 
form of Imatinib was embarked upon.35 Very specifically, the claims in the patent 
application alleged the following about the Beta crystalline form of Imatinib: 
(a) it had more beneficial flow properties;36 
(b) it had better thermodynamic stability;37 and 
(c) it had lower hydroscopicity than the alpha crystalline form of Imatinib.38  
It was alleged that these properties made the beta crystalline form of Imatinib "new" 
and superior due to its ability to store better, be processed more easily, and its having 
                                        
28  Novartis case para 5.  
29  Novartis case para 5. 
30  The patent was granted under US Patent Number 5 521 184. 
31  Imatinib Mesylate is marketed in India as Glivec.  
32  US Patent Number 6894051. 
33  Application No 1602/MAS/98. Novartis applied for a patent of Imatinib Mesylate in beta crystal 
form at the Chenai Patent Office on 17 July 1998 (Novartis case para 8). 
34  From 1 January 2005, India allowed drug patent protection in order to comply with the 
requirements under TRIPS. See specifically Chauduri 2012 Economic and Political Weekly 46. 
35  Novartis case para 6-7. 
36  Novartis case para 8. 
37  Novartis case para 8. 
38  Novartis case para 8. 
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"better processability of the methanesulfonic acid addition of a compound formula I" 
coupled with the advantage of storing and processing.39 
Two important developments occurred before the patent application was considered 
by the Chennai Patents Office. Firstly, the Patents Act was amended and section 3(d)40 
was introduced. Secondly, before the patent application was considered, it had 
attracted five pre-grant oppositions.41 The most vocal oppositions came from rival 
pharmaceutical companies and patient groups, basing their opposition mainly on the 
fact that the alleged invention had been anticipated, was obvious, and ran afoul of 
section 3(d) of the Patents Act. 
The matter relating to the patentability of the beta crystalline form of Imatinib was 
heard by the Assistant Controller of Patents and Designs and the application was 
rejected.42 The Assistant Controller of Patents and Designs rejected the application on 
the basis that the invention had been anticipated by reason of prior publication,43 its 
lack of novelty and its not meeting the acid test of section 3(d).44 
Novartis appealed the decision of the Assistant Controller of Patents and Designs to 
the High Court in Madras, in addition to asking for an order that section 3(d) was 
unconstitutional and also fell afoul of the TRIPS Agreement.45 At that time the 
Intellectual Property Appellate Body (IPAB) had not yet been formed. After the IPAB 
had been formed the matter was remitted to it by the Madras High Court. Despite 
ruling in favour of Novartis by reversing the findings of the Assistant Controller on 
novelty and non-obviousness, the IPAB ruled that the patent could not be granted in 
the light of the provisions of section 3(d) of the Act, which, according to the IPAB, 
                                        
39  Novartis case para 8. 
40  S 3(d) excludes from patentability "the mere discovery of a new form of a known substance which 
does not result in the enhancement of the known efficacy of that substance or of the mere use of 
a known process, machine or apparatus unless such known process results in a new product or 
employs at least one new reactant" (my emphasis). 
41  Novartis case para 13. Pre-grant opposition is provided for in s 25 of the Patents Act of 1970 as 
amended. 
42  The matter was heard on 15 December 2005. 
43  This was based on the fact that patents for the same subject matter had been granted under the 
Zimmerman patents. 
44  Novartis case para 14. 
45  Novartis case para 15. 
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introduces a higher standard of inventiveness and provides that what is patentable in 
other countries will not necessarily be patentable in India.46 The IPAB went a step 
further and observed that the specific section was particularly targeted at 
drugs/pharmaceutical substances.47 
Very peculiarly, the IPAB referred to the pricing policy of Novartis, which had exclusive 
marketing rights over Glivec, which sold at 120 000 Indian Rupees per month48 per 
required dose, and concluded that the patentability of the subject product would fall 
foul of section 3(b) of the Act, which prohibits the granting of patents on certain 
inventions the exploitation of which could cause public disorder, among other social 
ills.49 
Novartis then appealed the decision of the IPAB to the Supreme Court of India, which 
was initially reluctant to hear the appeal but was swayed by the public interest in the 
matter50 and the delays that had accompanied the finalisation of the matter. Judgment 
was delivered on 1 April 2013. 
3.3  The Supreme Court judgment 
Before delivering its judgment, the Supreme Court of India per Aftab Alam J reduced 
the issues at stake in the case to an enquiry into the true import of section 3(d) of the 
Act and how it interplays with clauses (j) and (ja) of section 2(1) of the Act.51 The key 
question to answer in the opinion of the Court was "does the product which Novartis 
claims as a patent qualify as a new product?"52 As a corollary to the question, it was 
crucial to enquire into whether the product in question had a characteristic feature 
that involves a technical advance over existing knowledge that makes the invention 
not obvious to a person skilled in the art (emphasis added).53 After affirming that the 
                                        
46  Novartis case para 17. 
47  Novartis case para 17. 
48  On the other hand, the price of generic equivalents was about 10 000 Rupees per person per 
month.  
49  Novartis case para 19. 
50  Novartis case paras 21-22. 
51  Novartis case para 3. 
52  Novartis case para 3. 
53  Novartis case para 3. 
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meaning of an invention is delimited by clauses (j) and (ja) of section 2(1) of the 
Patents Act, the Court went further and asked the rhetorical question of whether or 
not a product qualifying as an invention under the relevant clauses of section 2(1) 
could have its patentability status questioned under section 3(d).54 The Court 
answered the rhetorical question in the course of the judgment. 
Clauses (j) and (ja) had deleted section 5 of the previous Patents Act, which prohibited 
product patents in India, and at the same time, amendments were effected to section 
3, introducing section 3(d).55 The Court expressed the opinion that in order to 
understand the purport and objects of the amendments it was important to identify 
the mischief parliament wanted to check.56 The object which section 3(d) sought to 
achieve was to prevent evergreening, provide easy access to life-saving drugs to 
citizens, and realise the constitutional obligation to provide good health care to 
citizens.57 
After a detailed exposition of India's legislative history58 relating to intellectual property 
generally and patents in particular, the Supreme Court concluded that the law had 
been passed in order to protect India's policy space to afford good health to its citizens 
while complying with the basic prescripts of the TRIPS Agreement.59 The Court 
believed that the patent protection of pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical 
products might have the effect of putting life-saving medicines beyond the reach of a 
very large section of the population,60 and that the amendments were therefore 
justified. 
The Court clarified the pertinent legal provisions as follows:61 the 1970 Patents Act as 
amended in 2005 requires that inventions must be new (not anticipated), involve an 
                                        
54  Novartis case para 3. 
55  Novartis case paras 24-26. 
56  Novartis case para 26. 
57  The Supreme Court at para 18 cited with approval the object which was spelt out by the Madras 
High Court in earlier litigation in the matter. 
58  Novartis case paras 31-46.  
59  Novartis case para 66. 
60  Novartis case para 66. 
61  Novartis case paras 88-89. 
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inventive step,62 and be capable of being made or used in an industry.63 The 
requirement that an invention must involve an inventive step implies that there must 
be a feature that involves a technical advance as compared to existing knowledge or 
having economic significance or both.64 Further, this feature should be such that the 
invention is not obvious to a person skilled in the art.65 
With specific reference to section 3(d), the Court first of all observed that section three 
provides for "what are not inventions". 
Under section 3(d), the following are not inventions within the meaning of the Act: 
(d) the mere discovery of a new form of a known substance which does not result in 
the enhancement of the known efficacy of that substance or (emphasis in the 
original) the mere discovery of any new property or new use for a known substance 
or of the mere use of a known process, machine or apparatus unless such known 
process results in a new product or employs at least one new reactant. 
From the provisions of section 3(d) of the current Patents Act cited above, the words 
in bold were grafted onto the pre-2005 section 3(d) of the Patents Act of the 2005 
amendment of the law.66 The new section 3(d) adds the words in bold at the beginning 
of the provision, deletes the word "mere" before "use" in the old provision,67 and adds 
an explanation at the end of the clause.68 Very importantly, section 3(d) does have a 
detailed explanation that fully contextualises the extent of the exclusions.69 Citing 
Indian Parliamentary Debates, the Supreme Court observed that section 3(d) is 
targeted 80 per cent at drugs and pharmaceutical products and 20 per cent at 
agricultural chemicals.70 This was a bold admission by the Court - that section 3(d) 
                                        
62  S 2(1)(j)(i)-(iii) of the Patents Act. 
63  S 2(1)(ac) of the Patents Act. 
64  Novartis case para 89. 
65  Novartis case para 89. 
66  Novartis case para 95. 
67  The full text of the old s 3(d) is hereby reproduced verbatim for information as follows: "(d) the 
mere discovery of any new property or mere new use for a known substance or of the mere use 
of a known process, machine or apparatus unless such known process results in a new product or 
employs at least one new reactant". 
68  Novartis case para 96. 
69  The explanatory clause to s 3(d) provides that "salts, esters, ethers, polymorphs, metabolites, pure 
form, particle size, isomers, mixtures of isomers, complexes, combinations and other derivatives 
of known substances shall be considered to be the same substance, unless they differ significantly 
in properties with regard to efficacy". 
70  Novartis case para 97-98. 
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targets specific fields of technology (pharmaceuticals and agricultural chemicals) - 
since nothing had ever arisen in the context of the section in other fields of invention.71 
It was submitted on behalf of Novartis that section 3(d) was not an exception to 
patentability. Hence, once a substance satisfies the requirements in section 2(1)(j) 
and (ja), it satisfies the requirements of patentability. Consequently, section 3(d) did 
not apply to the Novartis case.72 This submission was made notwithstanding the 
concession by counsel for Novartis that the aim of section 3(d) was to prevent trifling 
change and evergreening while allowing and encouraging incremental patenting.73 
With specific reference to public health and the use of TRIPS flexibilities, Novartis 
argued that the best route was to make use of compulsory licences,74 revocation 
proceedings75 and multiple stages of patent opposition procedures76 rather than to 
make use of section 3(d).77 
The Supreme Court dismissed the above submissions on a number of grounds.78 
Firstly, the Court held that section 3(d) is not a provision ex majorie cautela (out of 
abundant caution), as was submitted on behalf of Novartis, when taking into account 
the totality of the historical development that led to the enactment of the provision.79 
Secondly, the Court cautioned that the relevant provision was enacted to deal with 
chemical patents and pharmaceuticals by setting additional qualifications for the 
patentability of such products.80 Thirdly, and very importantly, the Court clarified the 
position by stating that the door was wide open for true inventions but closed by 
                                        
71  Novartis case para 97-98. There is a likelihood that s 3(d) may be impugned at the WTO dispute 
settlement level on the ground that it is discriminatory in terms of targeting patents in specific 
fields of technology contrary to the TRIPS Agreement, which provides in A 27.1 that patents shall 
be available in all fields of technology, and that patent rights must be enjoyable "without 
discrimination" as to "the field of technology". However, see for a counter argument Lewis-
Lettington and Banda Survey of Policy and Practice 19, in which the authors convincingly argue 
that such discrimination should be characterised as addressing problem areas rather than technical 
fields. 
72  Novartis case para 99. 
73  Novartis case para 100. 
74  In terms of Ch XVI of the Patents Act. 
75  As provided for in ss 63, 64 and 65 of the Patents Act. 
76  In terms of s 25 of the Patents Act. 
77  Novartis case para 101. 
78  See Novartis case paras 102-104. 
79  Novartis case para 102. 
80  Novartis case para 103. 
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section 3(d) for repetitive patenting or the extension of patent terms on spurious 
grounds.81 In coming to the conclusion that section 3(d) applied to the case, the Court 
emphasised that different standards are set for things of different classes to qualify 
as inventions; and for medical drugs and other chemical substances, the invention 
threshold is set higher.82 
It was also argued on behalf of Novartis that the production of Imatinib Mesylate from 
Imatinib in a free base form was a result of a step involving a technical advance when 
compared to current knowledge, thus bringing into existence a new substance.83 The 
Supreme Court rejected this argument and ruled that the production of Imatinib 
Mesylate did not constitute an invention as contemplated in the current law of India.84 
In dismissing the submission, the Supreme Court remarked thus: 
… we firmly reject the appellant's case that Imatinib Mesylate is a new product and 
the outcome of an invention beyond the Zimmerman patent.85 
Therefore, the specific product did not satisfy the test of an "invention" as laid down 
in section 2(1)(j) and (ja) of the Patents Act.86 
With specific reference to the beta crystalline form of Imatinib, it was submitted on 
behalf of Novartis that section 3(d) applies if a substance is a new form of a known 
product having known efficacy, and that "known" in the specific context meant proven 
and well established while "known efficacy" meant "efficacy established empirically 
and proven beyond doubt".87 Citing with approval the case of Monsanto Company v 
Caramandel Indag Products (P) Ltd,88 the Supreme Court disagreed and rejected the 
submission on the basis that it was wrong in both fact and law.89 The court sealed the 
dismissal of the submission with the powerful observation that the beta crystalline 
form of Imatinib Mesylate is a new form of a known substance, namely, Imatinib 
                                        
81  Novartis case para 103. 
82  Novartis case para 104. 
83  Novartis case para 106. 
84  Novartis case para 133. 
85  Novartis case para 157. 
86  Novartis case para 157. 
87  Novartis case para 158. 
88  Monsanto Company v Caramandel Indag Products (P) Ltd (1986) 1 SCC 642. 
89  Novartis case para 159. 
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Mesylate, with well-known efficacy.90 Therefore, the fact that the beta form of Imatinib 
was a product that claimed to enhance the form of its old counterpart triggered the 
application of section 3(d).91 
Very specifically, the Court observed that in its application for a patent, Novartis 
averred that all the therapeutic qualities of the beta crystalline form of Imatinib 
Mesylate were also possessed by Imatinib in a free base form. This, therefore, raised 
the question of whether an enhanced efficacy over a known substance as demanded 
by section 3(d) existed.92 The Court held that the correct "efficacy" to consider in 
section 3(d) is "therapeutic efficacy" in the specific context of medicines.93 The Court 
further noted that the test for enhanced therapeutic efficacy must be applied strictly.94 
The Court, therefore, concluded that the physico-chemical properties of beta 
crystalline Imatinib Mesylate95 may be beneficial but do not add anything to 
therapeutic efficacy.96 On the contention submitted on behalf of Novartis that the beta 
crystalline form of Imatinib had increased bioavailability, the Court held that an 
increased bioavailability, in the absence of compelling proof, may not necessarily lead 
to an enhancement of therapeutic efficacy;97 hence Novartis' bid for a patent for the 
beta crystalline form of Imatinib Mesylate had to fail.98 
In conclusion, the Court ruled that the impugned form of Imatinib failed the test of 
invention as provided for in section 2(1) clauses (j) and (ja) and section 3(d), that it 
did not have enhanced therapeutic efficacy, and that Novartis' appeal had inevitably 
to fail.99 
In order to avoid doubt and a possible misinterpretation of its judgment in the light of 
the overflowing public interest in the matter both in India and internationally, the 
                                        
90  Novartis case para 161. 
91  Novartis case para 161. 
92  Novartis case para 163. 
93  Novartis case paras 179-180. 
94  Novartis case para 182. 
95  Namely that it has more beneficial flow properties, better thermodynamic stability and lower 
hygroscopicity. 
96  Novartis case para 187. 
97  Novartis case para 189. 
98  Novartis case para 190. 
99  Novartis case para 195. 
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Supreme Court issued a final note of clarity.100 It is submitted that the Court held quite 
correctly that the import of its judgment was not to outlaw incremental inventions of 
chemical and pharmaceutical patents, but that only those chemical and 
pharmaceutical inventions that did not lead to the enhancement of therapeutic efficacy 
were barred by the judgment.101 This clarification is welcome for jurisprudential 
certainty and puts Indian patent law on the subject in a positive light. 
As anticipated, the decision was warmly welcomed by access to medicines activists 
and patient organisations in India and beyond. Given India's key role in the global 
supply of affordable medicines, both patented and generic, there is no gainsaying that 
the decision has worldwide implications,102 including in the SADC. 
4  An evaluation of the case and lessons for the SADC 
From the above narration of facts and the outline of the decision of the Supreme Court 
of India, it is important to emphasise what the court said and did not say.103 
The court did not say that a new form of a known compound could not be patented; 
neither did it say that improving bioavailability characteristics of a drug may not result 
in enhanced efficacy.104 Rather, the court left open the issue of whether enhanced 
efficacy refers narrowly to the curative effect of the drug or more broadly to the 
improved safety and reduced toxicity of the drug.105 This clarity is important for 
allaying the fears of the US and like-minded countries that almost always conceive the 
contextual application of TRIPS flexibilities as an affront to IP rights. For example, in 
2013, the United States government listed ten developing countries on its priority 
watch list for various alleged IP violations. The Ukraine was listed as a "priority foreign 
country", which is a rare listing reserved for the worst offenders.106 
                                        
100  Novartis case para 191. 
101  Novartis case para 191. 
102  Lofgren 2013 The Conversation 1. 
103  Abbott 2013 Intellectual Property Watch 3. 
104  Abbott 2013 Intellectual Property Watch 3. 
105  Novartis case para 191. 
106  USTR 2013 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/05012013%202013%20Special%20301%20Report.pdf. 
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For the SADC, the manner in which the Indian Supreme Court dealt with the 
application of section 3(d) in the specific context should be encouraging. SADC 
members should be emboldened by this decision and embark on IP law reform that 
takes into account each member's social and economic needs. This is a general 
assumption based on the apparently widely accepted view that evergreening is bad 
and effects developing countries negatively. As previously said, section 3(d) is TRIPS-
plus, but it does not follow that TRIPS-plus IP legislative provisions are WTO-illegal.107 
South Africa has taken the lead and has boldly stated in its Draft IP Policy that it will 
not tolerate incremental patenting and a proliferation of evergreen patents.108 
Despite the decision in Novartis having been characterised in colourful terms by other 
writers and critics,109 this writer believes that the decision is relevant to the context 
obtaining in the SADC for the reasons outlined below. 
Although the rejection of Novartis' claims was met with criticism from the 
pharmaceutical industry as shifting the balance too much in favour of the protection 
of public health,110 the fact that the decision gave prominence to public health issues 
over IP must be celebrated as relevant to the current SADC situation in which law 
reform is still possible. In the judgment itself, in the course of describing the history 
of IP law in India the Supreme Court said that the Committee under the chairmanship 
of Justice N Rajagopala Ayyangar "took a fresh look at the law of patents to completely 
revamp and recast it to best subserve the (contemporary) needs of the country".111 
One of the observations of the Committee, which I don't entirely agree with, was that 
patent systems are not created in order to satisfy the interests of the inventor but 
rather to take care of the interests of the economy.112 
                                        
107  Abbott 2013 Intellectual Property Watch 3 submits that there is nothing wrong with the strict 
Indian standard and a similar approach was followed by the US Patent Office until the decision in 
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, in the case of In re Brana 34 USPQ2d 1441 (Fed Cir 
1995). 
108  See Draft National Policy on Intellectual Property 2013 in GN 913 in GG 36818 of 29 August 2013 
8-9. 
109  For example, Raju 2008 Indian Journal of Intellectual Property Law 7 regards the case and its 
development as a "saga". 
110  Barazza 2013 JIPLP 776. 
111  Abbott 2013 Intellectual Property Watch 3. 
112  Novartis case para 36. 
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This observation rings very true in the SADC region, which is urged to revamp its 
patent laws by taking advantage of TRIPS flexibilities in the context of regional 
priorities. Indeed, the rejection of Novartis' application was regarded by some health 
activists as a victory for public health.113 
The debate over the patentability of pharmaceuticals has been intense and in the 
majority of instances emotionally charged, when the right to patent exclusivity is pitted 
against the right to public health.114 The Supreme Court of India displayed sensitivity 
to the potential conflict, for both social and economic reasons.115 The Court did, in 
actual fact, show that it was aware of the conflict when it clearly recognised that the 
current IP system seeks to promote both innovation and social economic welfare in 
India, thus making the benefits of the patented invention available at reasonably 
affordable prices to the public.116 
The decision in Novartis relating to the interpretation of section 3(d) was well 
reasoned, since similar decisions have been handed down in other parts of the 
developed world in similar contexts.117 The case is however important because it deals 
with the subject in the context of a less powerful WTO member, India, and this will in 
all likelihood inspire and embolden other developing countries. The similar decisions 
referred to in this paragraph and the subsequent references to case law in footnote 
118 below are related to developed rather than developing countries. 
The main aim of section 3(d), as previously explained, is to prevent evergreening and 
avoid the issuing of patents that are of a low quality and add only insignificant 
                                        
113  't Hoen 2013 J Public Health Policy 370. 
114  Barazza 2013 JIPLP 786. 
115  Barazza 2013 JIPLP 786. 
116  Barazza 2013 JIPLP 786. 
117  Barazza 2013 JIPLP 786-787. The pertinent cited cases are Pfizer Inc v Apotex Inc [2007] 480 F 
3d 1348; Takeda Chemical Industries Ltd v Alphapharm Pty Ltd [2007] 492 F 3d 1350; SmithKline 
and French Laboratories v Evans Medical Aid Ltd [1989] FSR 561; In re Dillon [1990] 919 F 2d 
688; In re Deuel [1995] 51 F 3D 1552; In re Elli Lilly and Company v Premo Pharmaceutical 
Laboratories Inc [1980] 630 F 2d 120; and Les Laboratoires Servier v Apotex Inc [2008] EWCA 
445. 
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improvements to the state of the art.118 The concern about evergreen patents is not 
unique to India.119 
It is also important to note that the patent which Novartis sought to register in India 
was initially rejected by the US patent authorities for lack of novelty and granted only 
on appeal in May 2005.120 Evergreening is compounded by weak patent examination 
systems and chokes technological progress.121 Some SADC member states do not 
provide for a patent examination system, hence evergreening is likely to proliferate in 
such situations.122 
The problem is well illustrated in South Africa. According to the Treatment Action 
campaign (TAC) and Médecins Sans Frontiers (MSF), Novartis managed to register in 
South Africa a patent for a "new use" of Imatinib which does not expire until 2022, 
even though the original patent was set to expire earlier in 2013.123 To treat chronic 
myeloid leukaemia for one year in South Africa using Novartis' Imatinib costs over 
R387,000, a price out of reach for most South Africans and medical aid schemes. The 
stark irony is that what Novartis lost in the Supreme Court of India was gained in 
South Africa through the registration of a secondary new use form of Imatinib. This 
should be a lesson for fellow SADC members to seriously consider patent law reform 
that takes care of the loopholes in their laws relating to the requirements for 
patentability and the absence of a patent examination system. Patent thickets around 
a single molecule are particularly common in the pharmaceutical drug industry, where 
"minor modifications such as changes in size, colour, dosage, delivery mechanisms 
and compositions are either simultaneously or subsequently patented".124 India should 
be applauded for nipping this practice in the bud in the Novartis case, as has been 
described above. 
                                        
118  Roderick and Pollock 2012 The Lancet e2. 
119  EU 2010 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/pharmaceuticals/inquiry/staff_working_paper_part1.pdf. 
The US side of the debate is ably canvassed in Glasgow 2001 IDEA 227 while for Australia, 
Chalmers 2006 MULR 29 provides a useful critique. 
120  Coventry 2013 http://www.hardnewsmedia.com/2013/07/593?page=show. 
121  Coventry 2013 http://www.hardnewsmedia.com/2013/07/593?page=show. 
122  See generally, Ndlovu 2014 Speculum Juris 79-81. 
123  See TAC and MSF 2013 http://www.fixthepatentlaws.org/?p=638. 
124  Coventry 2013 http://www.hardnewsmedia.com/2013/07/593?page=show. 
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When pharmaceutical companies seek to maximise profits by patenting incrementally 
despite the obvious lack of novelty and inventive step, such behaviour, as was the 
case with Novartis in this instance, may fairly be characterised as patent abuse aimed 
at registering patents over minor insignificant changes in order to extend monopolistic 
prices.125 It is submitted that in addition to having robust legislative provisions along 
similar lines to India's section 3(d), SADC members may react to such forms of abuse 
through the deployment of compulsory licenses in the event of an abuse of patent 
rights, as ably provided for in most IP legislations of the member states.126 
The Novartis judgment delivers the message that the problem of low quality patents 
continues, aided and abetted by low quality patent examinations in the absence of 
pre- and post-grant patent opposition. Maybe it is now time to have many third world 
emulations of India's section 3(d), and such emulation seems to have already started 
in all earnest in Argentina, China and Thailand.127 The decision in Novartis must be 
celebrated, taking into account how it testifies to the "flawed project of global 
harmonization of intellectual property laws",128 which currently remains a pipedream 
which the SADC and the developing world can transform into context-specific reality 
through what Musungu, Villanueva and Blasetti characterise as "South-South 
cooperation".129 
The Novartis decision demonstrates that TRIPS flexibilities are not a paper tiger and 
can be used despite the pressure from big pharmaceutical companies and the US 
government.130 From the precedent set by the Novartis case, it is now possible for 
governments in developing countries (including the SADC) to set stringent 
patentability criteria for pharmaceuticals in order to facilitate the early entry of life-
                                        
125  At least this seems to have been the view of the Supreme Court in the Novartis case para 19, 
wherein the Court expressed the opinion that such high prices are prone to result in in the creation 
of public disorder. 
126  In South Africa, such a "compulsory licence in case of abuse of patent rights" is provided for in s 
56 of the Patents Act 57 of 1978.  
127  Coventry 2013 http://www.hardnewsmedia.com/2013/07/593?page=show 3. The author adds 
that there were reports soon after the judgment that Australia and Canada were considering 
provisions similar to s 3(d). 
128  Coventry 2013 http://www.hardnewsmedia.com/2013/07/593?page=show 3. 
129  See generally Musungu, Villanueva and Blasetti 2004 Utilizing TRIPS Flexibilities 35-79. 
130  Lofgren 2012 The Conversation 1-5. 
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saving, low-cost generics.131 To raise the patentability standards in the SADC region, 
patent examiners have to be trained to interpret patentability requirements strictly 
before granting pharmaceutical patents.132 
Because countries like India, China, Brazil and Thailand bring political and economic 
resources to bear on their interactions with multinational pharmaceutical companies 
and governments in the US and Europe,133 such strength may be used collaboratively 
to the benefit of other developing countries through South-South cooperation.134 
It will be recalled that pharmaceutical product patents were not recognised in India 
between 1972 and 2005, which is a situation that enabled the generic drug industry 
to flourish in India.135 This enabled India to supply the domestic market and external 
markets (both developed and developing) with affordable generic drugs.136 For 
example, it is reported that the entry of Indian firms in the global drug supply 
market137 lowered the prices of first-line triple combination antiretrovirals (ARVs), used 
in the treatment of HIV, from US$15 000 per person per annum in the year 2000 to 
less than US$120 in 2012.138 While the drug in dispute in the Novartis case had nothing 
to do with HIV/AIDS, this disease is very important in the SADC, and had the Supreme 
Court interpreted section 3(d) in favour of Novartis or struck it down completely, this 
would have had a devastating effect on access to medicines generally and HIV/AIDS 
drugs in particular. The importance of this decision in an HIV/AIDS context is aptly 
captured by Loon Gangte, president of the New Delhi Network of Positive People 
(DNP+). Interviewed by William New on the eve of the decision on the Novartis case, 
he said "We rely on the availability of affordable AIDS drugs and other essential 
medicines made by the Indian generic manufacturers to stay alive and healthy".139 
                                        
131  Lofgren 2013 The Conversation 1-7. 
132  Musungu, Villanueva and Blasetti Utilizing TRIPS Flexibilities 15. 
133  Lofgren 2013 The Conversation 5. 
134  Musungu, Villanueva and Blasetti 2004 Utilizing TRIPS Flexibilities 46. 
135  Lofgren 2013 The Conversation 2. 
136  Lofgren 2013 The Conversation 2. 
137  The importance of India as the "pharmacy of the world" was highlighted in the letters from the 
HIV/AIDS Director of the WHO and the Director of Advocacy, UNAIDS, reproduced by the Supreme 
Court of India in the Novartis case paras 76-77. 
138  Lofgren 2013 The Conversation 2. 
139  New 2011 Intellectual Property Watch 1. 
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In concluding the discussion of the lessons to be learnt by the SADC from the Novartis 
case, it is important to refer to the role that was played by civil society groups to 
highlight the high stakes and importance of access to medicines. It has been reported 
that the outcome of the case is consistent with the pattern in the 1990s of a de facto 
coalition between health advocates, NGOs and some governments, including India, 
which are desirous of limiting the impact of IP on access to medicines.140 
It needs to be recalled that various advocacy groups, such as Médecins Sans Frontiers, 
Health Gap in the US, the Delhi Network of Positive People and the Swiss-based Berne 
Declaration took part in lobbying against the Novartis case.141 In addition, leading up 
to the Novartis AGM demonstrations were held in a number of US cities such as Boston, 
New York and Washington, while in India more demonstrations were held as a way of 
drawing attention to the Novartis case.142 The role of civil society in promoting access 
to medicines is clear and need not be laboured here, save to say that apart from South 
Africa, most SADC countries have limited civil society activity, or like in Zimbabwe, 
they selectively criminalise civil society activities.143 In the Novartis case, there was a 
coalition of civil society groups from within India and beyond. The success of such a 
coalition should be an informative lesson for the SADC in the context of regional IP 
reform to improve access to medicines. 
The Novartis case is therefore important because it clearly shows that with a 
government that is sensitive to the peculiar public health needs of its people, it is 
possible to take full advantage of the TRIPS flexibilities with the aid of an independent 
judiciary and a robust civil society that works well with its global counterparts. The 
decision scored a victory for the generic industry in India by arresting incremental 
patenting and evergreening. The victory was achieved through the deployment of 
patentability provisions and opposition procedures in the Indian Patents Act. 
                                        
140  Lofgren 2013 The Conversation 3. 
141  Esalimba 2009 Intellectual Property Watch 1. 
142  Hermann 2012 Intellectual Property Watch 2.  
143  For example, in 2011 it was reported by the International Centre for Not-for-Profit Law 2012 IJNL 
20 that Zimbabwean police raided an academic meeting and arrested all civil society activists 
present for watching a video on the Arab Spring uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia. The activists were 
charged with treason or attempting to overthrow the government by unconstitutional means. 
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5  Recommendations 
Going slightly beyond the facts of the case and the sources consulted, the 
recommendations outlined below illustrate how the lessons highlighted above may be 
practically implemented in select SADC countries. The recommendations relate to new 
use patents, strengthening patent abuse provisions in order to curb evergreening, 
strengthening patentability requirements for medicines and related substances, and 
introducing patent searches and examinations in order to ensure that patents rejected 
in other jurisdictions are not registered in the SADC region. 
5.1  New use patents 
The Indian case discussed above was primarily a complaint about Novartis' attempt to 
register a patent in India for a drug that was already state of the art and therefore 
not really worthy of registration as a patent. A significant number of SADC members 
allow patents for new uses of known medicines, mostly through legislation that allows 
for the grant of patents generally without an express reference to the prohibition of 
new uses of known substances.144 Only three countries, namely Malawi,145 Namibia146 
and Zambia,147 have provisions in their relevant legislation specifically prohibiting the 
patenting of new uses of existing substances in the pharmaceutical context. It is 
therefore recommended that those SADC members that provide for new use patents 
in their laws should consider revising them in line with the Indian position by imposing 
conditions on the award of patents such as enhanced efficacy. For those countries 
that currently do not provide for new use patents in their IP laws, they are hereby 
urged to maintain the status quo, which is TRIPS compliant.148 
                                        
144  See for example s 25(9) of South Africa's Patents Act 57 of 1978, which provides for the 
patentability of such new uses without any further qualification or conditions. 
145  S 18 of Malawi's Patents Act, Chapter 49:02 excludes the patenting of inventions "capable of being 
used as food or medicine" which are "a mixture of known ingredients possessing only the 
aggregate of the known properties of the ingredients". 
146  Ss 17(1)(j)-(k) and 17(2) of the Namibia Industrial Property Act 2012 exclude the patenting of new 
uses of patents. 
147  The Zambian Patents Act, last amended in 1987, generally does not exclude new uses except in 
cases where the invention is capable of being used as food or medicine in a prohibitory context 
similar to that provided for in Malawian law (see s 18(1)(c) of the Zambian Patents Act). 
148  In terms of A 27 of TRIPS, patents shall be available for inventions of products and processes in 
all fields of technology as long as the inventions are new, involve an inventive step and are capable 
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5.2  Strengthening patent law provisions to curb evergreening 
The drug in dispute in the Indian case, Imatinib Mesylate, was patented in South Africa 
with no litigation ensuing.149 The most likely reason why this drug and its new use 
variants have been patented in South Africa since 1993 is the fact that South African 
patent law does not provide for mandatory patent searches and examinations.150 The 
Mesylate version of Imatinib was patented in South Africa in 1997 and the patent is 
due to expire in 2017, while a new use patent for the same drug was granted in 2002 
and is due to expire in 2022.151 In 2013 and 2014, Novartis applied for and was 
granted a process patent for the Process for the Preparation of Alpha Form Imatinib 
Mesylate152 and a product patent for the Pharmaceutical Granulate Comprising 
Imatinib Mesylate.153 
It is doubtful if such minor additions to Imatinib would have been patented in a legal 
system with a robust patent examination model. A substantive patent examination 
system would essentially involve an examination of the quality of the invention.154 This 
would entail a consideration of a number of pre-requisites such as the subject matter 
of the invention, which must be patentable; the industrial applicability aspect of the 
patent; and the novelty and inventiveness aspects.155 It is heartening to report that 
South Africa intends introducing substantive patent examinations in its legal system 
soon.156 
                                        
of industrial application. The TRIPS Agreement does not provide for the patenting of new uses of 
substances as a requirement for patentability. 
149  See CIPC 2015 http://patentsearch.cipc.co.za/. 
150  See s 34 of the Patents Act 57 of 1978 and Regulations 40 and 41 to the same Act. 
151  According to Cortes et al 2009 Journal of Clinical Oncology 427 there are no major therapeutic 
differences between Imatinib Mesylate and its new use counterpart.  
152  South African Patent Number 2013/00872, granted on 30 April 2013. 
153  South African patent Number 2014/06139, granted on 27 May 2015. 
154  Wen and Matsaneng 2013 http://www.compcom.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Patents-
Pharmaceuticals-and-Competition-Yu-Fang-Wen-and-Thapi-Matsaneng-Annual-Competition-
Conference-2013.pdf 8.  
155  Wen and Matsaneng 2013 http://www.compcom.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Patents-
Pharmaceuticals-and-Competition-Yu-Fang-Wen-and-Thapi-Matsaneng-Annual-Competition-
Conference-2013.pdf 9. 
156  See De Wet and Wild 2014 http://mg.co.za/article/2014-10-30-new-drug-policy-is-patently-high-
risk in which Elena Zdravkova, the senior manager for patents and designs in the CIPC, confirmed 
that South Africa had already set aside a budget for the training of patent examiners by October 
2015. 
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In the SADC region, Botswana's Industrial Property Act of 2010 may be regarded as 
model legislation for patent examinations.157 The relevant law provides for an 
examination of the subject of a patent application in order ascertain if it complies with 
the requirements of the Act,158 and also grants the Minister responsible for patents 
the discretion to designate certain patent applications as exempt from an examination 
covering the requirements for novelty and inventiveness.159 Although Botswana's law 
in this specific context could have been drafted better, it is a good example of taking 
a deliberate step that will limit the abuse of the patent system and curb evergreening. 
It is therefore recommended that SADC members include patent examination 
provisions in their laws in order to ensure that only deserving patents are granted. 
5.3  Patentability requirements for medicines and related substances 
Historically, there was an initial reluctance to allow patents on pharmaceutical 
products in many jurisdictions.160 The French Patent Act of July 5, 1844 on patents161 
(Loi du 5 juillet 1844 sur les brevets d'invention), for example, excluded from 
protection "[L]es compositions pharmaceutiques ou remedes de toute espece", (my 
emphasis) that is, pharmaceutical compositions or medicines of all kinds.162 The Act 
banned patents on pharmaceutical products and their pharmaceutical composition but 
not the process of fabrication of a pharmaceutical substance.163 The ban remained 
until 1959, when an ordinance was passed providing that patents would be granted 
for pharmaceutical products, with a possibility of issuing compulsory licences in the 
case of insufficient quantities and abnormally high prices.164 
All SADC members have provisions in their laws allowing for the granting of 
pharmaceutical patents.165 In addition, more than 50 per cent of the SADC members 
                                        
157  See specifically s 22 of the Botswana Industrial Property Act 2010. 
158  S 22(1) of the Botswana Industrial Property Act 2010. 
159  S 22(2) of the Botswana Industrial Property Act 2010. 
160  See Kropholler and Zweigert Sources of International Uniform Law 718. 
161  French Patent Act, adopted on 5 July 1844. 
162  See Kropholler J and Zweigert K Sources of International Uniform Law 718. 
163  This obviously did not auger well for patent protection, thus leaving the product vulnerable to 
illegal reproduction with impunity.  
164  Kropholler J and Zweigert K Sources of International Uniform Law 719. 
165  This may be by virtue of specific provisions in the pertinent patents legislation or membership of 
the Patent Cooperation Treaty and the African Regional Intellectual Property Organisation (ARIPO) 
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are least developed countries (LDCs), which are not obliged in terms of the WTO 
TRIPS Agreement to enforce patents.166 All SADC countries are members of the 
WTO.167 The ARIPO Harare Protocol provides for the patentability of new inventions 
that involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial application.168 While it is 
not disputed that pharmaceutical products should be patented in order to spur 
technological innovation in the field, SADC members must consider amending their 
patent laws in order to provide a special regime for the patentability of 
pharmaceuticals. Important lessons in this specific regard may be drawn from India 
and Brazil. 
This paper recommends that SADC members adopt either the Indian or the 
Argentinian approach. In India new forms of known substances (except those that 
show a significantly enhanced therapeutic effect) may not be patentable.169 In 
Argentina, the law provides for a basic exception for patents on new forms of known 
substances,170 but details of the exception are spelt out in regulatory guidelines rather 
than in the text of the relevant legislation. 
The foregoing recommendations have been proposed as concrete practical examples 
of legislative measures that SADC members may adopt, after contextualising the 
lessons learned from Novartis v India to the region. 
6  Conclusions 
Although Indian law does not apply to the SADC region, the lessons discussed in this 
paper are generalisable to the SADC context. The case provides a good example of 
                                        
Harare Protocol with 19 members, namely Botswana, The Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Rwanda, São Tomé and Príncipe, Somalia, Sudan, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
166  See A 66.1 of the TRIPS Agreement. LDCs in the SADC region are Lesotho, Swaziland, 
Mozambique, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Malawi, Tanzania, Seychelles and Zambia. 
167  WTO 2015 https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm. 
168  A 10(a) of the Harare Protocol on Patents and Industrial Designs within the Framework of the 
African Regional Intellectual Property Organisation (ARIPO) text entered into force on April 25, 
1984, and amended by the Administrative Council of ARIPO on April 27, 1994, November 27, 1998, 
November 24, 2000, November 21, 2003, November 24, 2006, November 30, 2011 and November 
25, 2013. 
169  S 3(d) of the Indian Patents Act as amended in 2005.  
170  See Ignacio 2012 https://www.aippi.org/enews/2012/edition25/Ignacio.html. 
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how to take maximum advantage of one of the TRIPS flexibilities, namely setting 
national criteria for patentability. In identifying the source of lessons for SADC from 
outside the region, it is important to select lessons from countries with socio-economic 
conditions similar to those that prevail in the SADC. India is therefore appropriate as 
a source of the lessons, based on the fact that it is a developing WTO member which 
most SADC members are likely to use as a source of generic drugs. 
While the Indian legislative inclusion of the relevant TRIPS flexibility may be regarded 
as going slightly beyond the minimum prescribed by the TRIPS Agreement ie TRIPS-
plus, such inclusions are TRIPS-compliant. It is therefore recommended that SADC 
members embark on IP legislative reforms along similar lines to the Indian. 
For example, South Africa, a SADC member with one of the highest HIV/AIDS infection 
rates in the world, does not have provisions in its patent laws dealing with pre-grant 
opposition to patents as a condition precedent to the granting of a patent. Such an 
omission does not augur well for access to medicines and deserves a legal 
administrative rethink. Patent offices must therefore push for high standards of 
disclosure in order to discourage the filing of bogus patent applications meant to serve 
a gate-keeping function to the entry of generics in the market. SADC member states 
may, therefore, consider dealing with this problem by requesting technical assistance 
from the WTO171 and the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) to amend 
their laws so that patent examination becomes mandatory. 
One of the most important lessons for SADC members is that the TRIPS Agreement 
does not prevent them from denying the patentability of new uses of drugs for lack of 
novelty, the involvement of an inventive step and the lack of industrial applicability. 
Developing countries and SADC member states would be within their rights if they 
excluded new uses of known products including diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical 
methods from patentability in order to protect their citizens' right to health and by 
extension, their access to medicines. 
                                        
171  Article 66 of TRIPS mandates developed WTO members to provide, upon request, financial and 
technical cooperation to their developing and least developed counterparts on mutually agreed 
terms and conditions. Such cooperation includes assistance in the preparation of laws and 
regulations to prevent the abuse of intellectual property rights.  
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